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This article studies the level of knowledge and information held by drivers 
in the car parking market. By drawing on a survey conducted with 576 
garage customers in Barcelona, we provide new evidence on the market 
frictions produced by the misinformation and misperception of drivers 
searching for parking spaces. We identify the factors that 
aggravate/mitigate misinformation and misperception, and examine how 
they affect the functioning of the parking market, damaging market 
competition, undermining effective regulatory actions and exacerbating 
negative externalities. Our evidence shows that drivers’ misperceptions 
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Cities today face increasing traffic-related problems. Their mobility patterns are still 
heavily dependent on cars, which results in severe congestion, pollution, noise and 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions that generate severe economic and environmental 
problems (OECD, 2007 and 2014). To tackle these issues many local authorities have 
adopted car parking regulations as a travel demand management (TDM) tool, but the 
intrinsic distortions of the parking market (i.e.: cruising-for-parking, garage localized 
market power, etc.), their true cost and the implications for land use demand, public 
space allocation, city economic vitality and the transmission of distortions to other 
(intermediate good) markets are not yet fully understood. 
Cities have largely underrated the importance of parking and policy implementation 
in this area still lags behind the advances proposed by researchers to exploit the benefits 
of parking regulations to the full (Barter, 2015; Mingardo et al., 2015). Many cities 
continue to apply regulations that consider parking as an infrastructure that needs to 
satisfy on-site demand and, thus, avoid spillovers. Others have adopted more intense 
curbside parking regulations and, additionally, have opted to promote off-street supply. 
Yet, curbside fees have generally been set too low and policymakers have neglected the 
fact that curbside parking and garages form a bundle of what are essentially substitute 
services that consumers choose by imposing their interlinked demands (Kobus et al., 
2014; Gragera and Albalate, 2016). 
Parking research has shown the relevance of the welfare loss associated with market 
distortions (Inci et al., 2017) and proposes various market-oriented policy interventions 
to eliminate cruising-for-parking. These include optimal uniform, time-varying 
(performance-based) and differentiated fees, and the regulation of the price differential 
between garages and the curb (Inci, 2015). However, such interventions rely on the 
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assumption that parkers have perfect information about the spatial/temporal availability 
of parking options and their characteristics (prices and quality). 
The information economics literature shows that, as long as information acquisition 
(search) is costly, it is rational for consumers not to be fully informed at the expense of 
their taking non-optimal decisions, such as visiting stores that they might otherwise not 
choose if they had availed themselves of more accurate information or giving up a 
search rapidly owing to its high costs with respect to its expected benefits. Indeed, the 
impact of information frictions on market outcomes is well recognized in a wide variety 
of sectors (Stigler, 1961; Stiglitz, 2000 and 2002). 
Recent evidence on information frictions in the parking market has likewise been 
reported. Albalate and Gragera (2018) show that a lack of knowledge on the part of 
consumers results in their paying higher prices (even when there are many competitors 
in the market) and, furthermore, that garage operators take advantage of this by 
employing price obfuscation strategies.1 They also suggest that active information 
acquisition (search) is no guarantee that drivers obtain better deals and that only 
experience seems to help them purchase at lower rates. The authors show that drivers do 
not have enough information to optimize their decisions and information frictions mean 
market outcomes deviate from a scenario of perfect competition. 
Lee and Agdas (2017) report that errors in driver perceptions of parking costs are 
among the main factors encouraging drivers to cruise for on-street parking, revealing  
that even drivers who claim to be familiar with these costs are not in possession of 
complete or accurate information. This, combined with the information frictions 
                                                             
 
 
1 That is, actions aimed at increasing the consumers’ search costs so as to raise prices and avoid 
competition. In Barcelona’s garage market, obfuscation is achieved by failing to display prices outside the 
garage or by devising complex pricing schemes to impede understanding of real costs. See Albalate and 
Gragera (2018) for more information about these strategies. 
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described above, undermines any potential benefits from the implementation of 
suggested policy interventions. 
The parking industry recognizes the importance of information as revealed by its 
gradual application of innovative technologies to promote real-time communication of 
pricing and availability, smartphone applications and new guidance systems to better 
serve its customers. Indeed, there has been a boom of new business models including 
transaction brokers and information-gathering platforms (Parkopedia, SpotHero, 
Yellowbrick, Bestparking) that provide parking information-related services. The 
parking research literature has analyzed drivers’ search strategies (Polak and Axhausen, 
1990; Thomson and Richardson, 1998; Bonsall and Palmer, 2004; Karaliopoulos et al., 
2017) and examined more broadly the theoretical or simulated advantages of different 
designs and applications of innovative technology to parking guidance systems 
(Caicedo, 2010; Wang and He, 2011; Kokolaki et al., 2012; Shin and Jun, 2014). 
However, parking research to date has evolved separately from the consumer behavior 
literature and has tended to overlook the importance of just how consumers acquire 
information and transform it into useful knowledge that determines their choices. 
Most consumers learn about market characteristics when shopping, be it consciously 
or unconsciously (Jensen and Grunert, 2014); yet, it is not unusual for them to have very 
little actual knowledge, being particularly unaware of producers’ pricing strategies 
(Estelami and Lehmann, 2001). Here, the literature differentiates between subjective 
knowledge (in our context what parkers think they know) and objective knowledge (the 
accuracy of what they know), and suggests that the two have a different impact on 
consumers’ ability to optimize their purchase decisions (Raju et al., 1995). Both 
dimensions are mildly to moderately correlated (Flynn and Goldsmith, 1999; Alba and 
Hutchinson, 2000) and indicate that consumers do not correctly calibrate what they 
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really know, leaving room for intrinsic biases that impose imperfect information 
resulting in market demand misallocation. Repeated exposure to prices due to purchase 
frequency is shown to increase the likelihood of the elaboration and rehearsal of price 
information (Estelami and Lehmann, 2001). This affects both consumers’ objective and 
subjective knowledge but is reported as being more strongly correlated with the latter 
(Park et al., 1994). The intuition is that extensive exposure does not necessarily lead to 
more accurate knowledge of market characteristics but does increase the amount of 
information gathered leading to greater knowledge self-assessment (Mägi and Julander, 
2005). 
In this paper, we study the level of subjective information – hereinafter, 
misinformation – and its accuracy – hereinafter, misperception – in the market for 
parking in Barcelona. By drawing on a survey conducted with 576 garage users, we are 
the first to assess the contribution of several potential determinants of these two 
dimensions of information for the parking market. This analysis is relevant both for 
local authorities and the parking industry, given that a lack of knowledge might cause 
demand misallocation, reduce the effectiveness of pricing strategies, impede effective 
price competition, aggravate current market distortions (cruising and garages’ localized 
market power) and hinder the efficiency of any proposed policy intervention that does 
not first address parkers’ information levels. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and variables 
used and section 3 describes the methods employed. Results are presented in section 4. 
The paper ends with a brief summary and a policy discussion derived from our main 
results.  
2. Data and variables 
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As described in Albalate and Gragera (2018), we use the data gathered in a survey 
conducted with 576 respondents among garage users at 61 different facilities located 
throughout Barcelona, but concentrated primarily in the city’s central business district 
and surrounding areas (see Figure 1).2 The survey was conducted in a single wave over 
two consecutive weeks in February 2016, during business hours. The survey was 
conducted to parkers that were either about to leave the garage facility after parking 
their vehicle or when they returned to pick it up (but always before payment). As users 
included both subscribers and occasional parkers, we opted to discard all observations 
from subscribers and all-day parkers and to focus our analysis on the market for 
occasional parking demand. This gave us a final sample of 534 valid responses.  
To assess the determinants of the parkers’ misinformation, the survey included 
questions about the drivers’ level of information about the parking options available to 
them (other garages) and the fees associated with each option, both regulated curb 
(commercial and mixed-use spots) and off-street (other garages) parking.3 The survey 
also included questions about the active information acquisition activities (search) users 
undertook, and other items that might passively influence the parkers’ ability to obtain 
this information, in addition to their trip and demographic characteristics.  
As we seek to measure misperception (i.e. the accuracy of the information they 
hold), we need to measure the parkers’ ability to recall the prices to which they have 
                                                             
 
 
2 Our empirical strategy draws on a sample that discarded responses from car park subscribers and all-day 
parkers.  
3 Commercial parking spots are regulated (paid) spaces in rotation where any driver can park without 
price discrimination. Mixed-use parking spaces are regulated (paid) spots where residents enjoy much 
cheaper prices than the rest of parkers. Mixed-use spaces are implemented in cities such as Amsterdam, 
London, Paris, Munich, Copenhagen, Stockholm and Chicago, among others. In Barcelona, mixed-use 
spaces are more expensive for non-residents than are commercial spaces.  
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been exposed by comparing the prices they recall with the garages’ real prices.4 
Curbside parking information was provided by Barcelona Serveis Municipals (BSM), 
and garage fees and characteristics were extracted from a parking inventory conducted 
during the same period, as described in Albalate and Gragera (2017; 2018). From the 
inventory we also obtained data about the garage market structure in the area in which 
the respondents parked. Finally, information about specific features of the area (district 
and neighborhood) was obtained from the Barcelona City Council Statistics 
Department.  
2.1 Dependent variables: 
We consider three binary variables to study misinformation. They specifically measure 
parkers’ subjective knowledge about alternative garage parking options and about both 
curbside and garage prices:   
o Info_Options: takes a value of 1 if the respondent declares having current 
knowledge of the existence of other parking options available in the area where 
he/she parked, and 0 otherwise. This variable is considered in order to study the 
determinants of the level of knowledge of the set of market alternatives in the 
area of parking.  
o Info_CF: takes a value of 1 if the respondent declares having current knowledge 
of the fee charged at the curb (both commercial and mixed-use spots) in the area 
surrounding the garage where he/she parked, and 0 otherwise. This variable is 
                                                             
 
 
4 We use the term ‘price recall’ as employed in the consumer behavior literature. Thus, we assume that 
parkers have been exposed to some price information that they have processed and stored (either 
consciously or unconsciously) for later use. It is specifically this stored knowledge that we are interested 
in here and which we ask them to recall. 
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included as a dependent variable to study the determinants of knowledge of 
curbside prices that compete with garages.  
o Info_GF: takes a value of 1 if the respondent declares having current knowledge 
of the garage’s fee where he/she parked, and 0 otherwise. This variable is 
included as a dependent variable to study the determinants of knowledge of 
garage prices.  
Additionally, we constructed two dependent variables to study misperception. These 
seek to measure the parkers’ objective knowledge based on the accuracy with which 
they can recall the garage and curbside prices to which they have been exposed:   
o Garage_misp: Garage fee misperception is measured by the difference between 
the garage fees recalled by the respondents and real garage fees (absolute rates, 
cents of euro) for the first hour of parking, as described in equation (2).  
𝐺𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒_𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑝 = |𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐺𝐹𝑖 − 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝐺𝐹𝑖|     (2) 
where GFi is the fee charged by the garage in which respondent i parked.  
o Curb_misp: Curbside fee misperception is measured by the difference between 
the curbside fees recalled by respondents and real fees (absolute rates, cents of 
euro) for the first hour of parking, as described in equation (1). 
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑏_𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑝 = | 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐶𝐹𝑖 − 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝐹𝑖  |   (1) 
where CFi is the weighted curbside fee charged in the area around the garage in 
which respondent i parked.  
2.2. Covariates 
To explain the level of misinformation and the degree of misperception, we consider a 
variety of possible determinants that might influence both consumers’ subjective and 
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objective information dimensions by determining their ability to obtain and process 
parking market information which they can put to use. The categories of variables 
considered are the respondents’ socioeconomic and demographic traits, covariates 
related to their actual parking behavior, trip characteristics, regressors associated with 
the garages’ features and with certain characteristics of the area in which the garage is 
located.  
- Sociodemographic covariates:  
o Age: This variable is a continuous variable with values equal to the respondents’ 
ages. We also experiment with models in which we categorize this variable by 
age intervals. We considered three intervals to distinguish broad age groups. 
Age18-30 takes a value of 1 if the respondent’s age is between 18 and 30 and 0 
otherwise; Age65 takes a value of 1 if the respondent is older than 64, and 0 
otherwise. The reference category is the group of respondents aged between 31 
and 64.  
o Gender: This binary variable takes a value of 1 if the respondent is male and 0 
if female. We include this variable to account for the fact that consumers of a 
specific gender might account for a larger volume of purchases and, thus, have 
higher knowledge levels. 
o Vehicle price: The price of the vehicle is computed as the actual selling price of 
the vehicle (in thousands of euro) reported as being driven by the respondent.5 
We use this continuous variable as an income proxy. We also created binary 
variables to identify three vehicle price groups for those below 10,000 euros 
                                                             
 
 
5 As in Albalate and Gragera (2017), this is calculated using an internet price information aggregator 
(coches.com). As a robustness check, we also include a depreciated vehicle value taking into account the 
year of purchase as reported by the respondent. 
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(which works as a benchmark variable), for those between 10,000 and 20,000 
(VP10K-20K) and, finally, a last group including vehicles priced over 20,000 
euros (VP20K+). The inclusion of these binary variables improves the fit of the 
model with respect to the same model with the continuous variable. 
- Parking behavior covariates 
o Teletac: This binary variable takes a value of 1 if the respondent uses an 
electronic payment method, teletac (Bip&Drive), to pay, and 0 otherwise. This 
variable is included to evaluate whether indirect involvement with the act of 
payment affects user information and perception of parking costs. 
o Time: This variable is constructed with the number of minutes the respondent 
left (or expects to leave) their vehicle in the garage. It is included to evaluate 
whether the length of time affects the information of customers that park for 
longer time periods, given that the hourly cost may have a greater weight in the 
total parking cost.  
o Discount: This binary variable takes a value of 1 if the respondent is entitled to 
some kind of discounted parking fee. It is included to assess whether receiving a 
discount affects information about the full or regular parking fee, due to higher 
levels of exposure and the greater demands made on information processing.  
o Searchgarage: This binary variable is included to account for the previous 
search activity of respondents looking for other garages before opting to park 
their vehicle in the present one. It takes a value of 1 if the respondent reported 
having looked for other garages, and 0 otherwise.  
o Searchcurb: This variable takes a value of 1 if the respondent reported having  




o Searchinfo: This binary variable is included in models of misinformation 
(regarding both the availability of garages and parking prices) and price 
misperception. It takes a value of 1 when the respondent reports having 
searched for information before the trip, and 0 otherwise.  
- Trip characteristics: 
o Frequent: This is a binary variable that takes a value of 1 if the respondent had 
used that garage on a previous occasion and 0 if they are a first time user. This 
variable is included to assess whether parkers have acquired information from 
previous purchasing experiences on past visits. 
o Frequency: This discrete variable takes the value of the number of times the 
respondent parks in a given garage each month. It is included to assess more 
precisely whether parkers acquire information due to greater exposure to the 
same market area. 
o Trip purpose: We include a set of binary variables related to the main purpose 
of the driver’s trip in an attempt to capture differences in the garages’ attributes 
which might condition the level of user knowledge and its accuracy. 
 Compulsory_Mobility: takes a value of 1 if the main purpose is related to 
work or educational activities, and 0 otherwise. This variable captures the 
effects of compulsory mobility.  
 Leisure: takes a value of 1 if the trip’s main purpose is related to shopping 
or leisure activities, and 0 otherwise.  
 Personal: takes a value of 1 if the main purpose of the trip is to visit 
family or friends, or it is made for health care reasons, and 0 otherwise.  
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 Administrative: takes a value of 1 if the main purpose is related to the 
need to complete some administrative obligation in or around the area, 
and 0 otherwise.  
- Garage features  
o Saliency: This binary variable takes a value of 1 if the garage in which the 
respondent parked displays its prices outside the facility and they are visible. It 
seeks to measure exposure to price information, since by construction all 
respondents have been exposed to prices when surveyed. We would expect 
price saliency to be negatively correlated with misinformation and 
misperception as an obfuscation effect. 
o Complexity: This continuous variable takes the value of the number of string 
characters used in the price schedule displayed and charged to garage 
customers. This variable captures the degree of complexity of the prices garages 
charge their customers, i.e. requiring additional cognitive effort to transform 
information exposure into usable knowledge. We expect this variable to 
correlate positively with the degree of misinformation and misperception given 
that complexity is an obfuscation strategy. 
o Facility: A binary variable taking a value of 1 if the garage is located within a 
specific facility, typically a shopping mall, cultural venue or a hospital. As such, 
this gives drivers incentives to disregard a garage’s attributes, given that the 
choice of parking might be highly correlated with the facility as trip end.  
o Franchise: A further binary variable taking a value of 1 if the garage belongs to 
a network of several same brand garages. This is included to capture the 
possibility of a user having better knowledge due to the fact they know the 
brand, thus facilitating attribute recognition and making knowledge gathered in 
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each of their facilities highly transferable (i.e. pricing strategies). This is 
expected to increase both objective and subjective knowledge and so affect 
misperception and misinformation. 
- Area features: 
o N_Garages: This variable takes the value of the number of other garage signs 
visible from the entrance to the garage where the respondent has parked their 
vehicle. This variable is included to account for other nearby garage alternatives 
readily identifiable by in-situ inspection.  
o Economic_Activity: This continuous variable takes the value of the number of 
square meters (in thousands) of economic activities that lie within each 
respondent’s relevant market area. It is included to capture an additional source 
of information acquisition since the greater an area’s economic vitality the easier 
it is for drivers to undertake various errands during the same trip, thus increasing 
their passive exposure to parking information in the area. 
o Districts: We also include district fixed effects to account for certain 
unobservable area characteristics that might be correlated with the respondents’ 
misinformation and misperception.  
Table 1 shows the main descriptive statistics of the variables employed.  




We specify two kinds of model depending on the nature of the dependent variable. To 
analyze misinformation in the parking market, we explore three different subjective 
knowledge dimensions that take into consideration whether parkers report having 
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knowledge of alternative garages available in the area (Info_Options), garage prices 
(Info_GF) and curbside prices (Info_CF). In this way we consider the binary nature of 
all the dependent variables and apply probabilistic models, including logistic 
regressions. To analyze misperception in this market, we explore two different objective 
knowledge dimensions that take into consideration the accuracy with which parkers can 
recall garage (Garage_misp) and curb (Curb_misp) prices, measured as the absolute 
difference between the prices they recall and the true prices. In this way we consider the 
continuous nature of most of the dependent variables. We apply ordinary least squares 
(OLS) and generalized linear regression models (GLM), the latter to verify the OLS 
results and to account for the fractional response nature of price deviation ratios. 
Given the number of variables and possible specifications, our ultimate choice is based 
on the fit of the models.6 Likewise, we take into account potential problems of 
multicollinearity from the inclusion of the covariates. Below, we present the models that 
offer the best fit for each dependent variable, even if this means our having to exclude 
some of the covariates at our disposal.  
3.1 Misinformation models (logistic regression). 
As all three dependent variables related to misinformation are binary in nature we 
implement logistic regression models. Both probit and logit models are types of GLMs 
                                                             
 
 
6 Each model uses only those observations for which complete information was available for all the 
variables used. This means we eliminated those items for which respondents were unable/unwilling to 
report specific information. 
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that can be used to model the relationship between one or more numerical or categorical 
predictor variables and a categorical outcome such as a binary dependent variable.  
In spite of the similarity in their respective outcomes, the models differ in terms of the 
link function they use. Logistic models use a logistic link function – known as the 
cumulative distribution function of the logistic distribution – which is more flexible 
than that employed by the probit models, that is, they use the inverse of the normal 
distribution as a link function – known as the cumulative distribution function of the 
standard normal distribution. Thus, the latter relies on the strict assumption of the 
normal distribution. An additional reason to opt for logistic regression models is to 
facilitate the interpretation of coefficients. Unlike probit models, the logistic regression 
allows us to back transform log-odds into odds ratios (by exponentiation of the 
coefficients) and so obtain a more intuitive way of interpreting effects. Thus, our results 
here are presented in odds ratios.  
The logistic link function takes the following form: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 (𝑝) =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋1𝛽2𝑋2+. . . +𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑘                             (1) 
where p is the probability of the dependent variable taking a value of 1 (y=1) and X is a 
vector of explanatory variables or predictors. The logit transformation is defined as the 
logged odds: 
logit (p) = ln(
p
1−p
) = β0 + β1X1β2X2 + βkXk                         (2) 
The logistic regression estimation chooses parameters that maximize the likelihood of 
observing the sample values. Note also that the logistic regression equation is readily 




 = exp( β0 + β1𝑋1+β2𝑋2+. . . +β𝑘𝑋𝑘)                                   (3) 
15 
 







                                   (4) 
The following specifications for each regression model offer the best fit and, therefore, 
constitute our definitive models. Equation (5) refers to the customers’ knowledge of 
alternative garages, equation (6) to their knowledge of the curbside fee and (7) to their 
knowledge of the fee charged by the garage in which they parked their vehicle.  
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜_𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖) =  β0 + β1𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖  +β2𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟i + β3Frequenti + β4Vehicle_Pricei +
β5𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡i + β6𝑇𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑐i + β7𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝐺𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒i+β8𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜i + β9Leisurei +
β10Personali+β11Admini+β12Facilityi+β13Eco_Activityi + εi       (5) 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜_𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑏𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑖) = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝐴𝑔𝑒1830𝑖  + 𝛿2𝐴𝑔𝑒65 +𝑖 +𝛿3𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛿4𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 +
𝛿5VP10K − 20Ki + 𝛿6VP20K +i+ 𝛿7𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝛿8𝑇𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑖 + 𝛿9𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖 +
𝛿10𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑖+𝛿11𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑖 + 𝛿12𝐿𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖 +
𝛿13𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖+𝛿14𝐴𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖+𝛿15𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖+𝛿16N_Garagesi + 𝛿17Eco_Activityi + 𝑖                 (6) 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜_𝐺𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑖) =  λ0 + λ1𝐴𝑔𝑒1830𝑖  +λ2Age65i + λ3𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟i + λ4Frequenti +
λ5𝑉𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒_𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒i + λ6𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡i + λ7𝑇𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑐i + λ8𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒i+λ9𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝐺𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒i+λ10𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜i +
λ11Leisurei + λ12Personali+λ13Admini+λ14Facilityi+λ15Franchisei + λ16Complexityi +
λ17Saliencyi + λ18N_Garagesi + λ19Eco_activityi + εi       (7) 
3.2 Misperception models (OLS and GLM). 
Misperception or information accuracy is measured as the difference between price 
recall and the true price. Here, therefore, we implement linear regression models with 
the OLS estimator which requires that the error distribution follows a normal 
distribution. An inspection of the error term indicates a fit that is closer to that of a 
negative binomial distribution. Hence, we applied a log-transformation of our 
dependent variable to obtain a distribution that was closer to the normal. This helps both 
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in applying the OLS estimator and in obtaining an interpretation of coefficients that is 
more straightforward than that of models accounting for Poisson and Negative binomial 
distributions. To verify the OLS results, we also conducted GLMs that allow for 
different error distributions and different relationships between the response variable 
and the independent variables. However, as the results are largely similar, here we opt 
to report and discuss just OLS results of the following models.7  
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐺𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒_𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑖) =  β0 + β1𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖  +β2𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟i + β3Frequencyi + β4𝑉𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒_𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒i +
β5𝑇𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑐i + Timei + β6𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝐺𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒i+β7𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜i + β8Leisurei +
β9Personali+β10Admini+β11Facilityi+λ15Franchisei + λ16Complexityi +
λ17Saliencyi+β12N_Garagei + β13Eco_Activityi + εi      (8) 
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑏_𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑖) = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝐴𝑔𝑒1830𝑖  + 𝛿2𝐴𝑔𝑒65 +𝑖  + 𝛿3𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖 + 𝛿4𝑉𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒_𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 +
𝛿5𝑇𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑖 + 𝛿6𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖 + 𝛿7𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑖+𝛿8𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑖 + 𝛿9𝐿𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖 +




Our descriptive statistics show that drivers have a significant lack of knowledge 
about their alternative parking options and about parking fees. Only 51% of parkers 
reported knowing of the existence of at least one other garage in the area and 65% of 
these reported not knowing their characteristics. The mean knowledge of available 
alternatives is higher among those that have previously used the specific garage facility 
                                                             
 
 
7 GLMs applied in the verification of the OLS results do in fact account for the negative binomial 
distribution of the error term. Results available upon request.  
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than it is among first time users, providing preliminary evidence of the accumulation of 
knowledge of available alternatives through experience. 
The respondents’ lack of information about prices is even more striking: 74% 
reported not knowing the fees charged by the garage where they parked. This 
percentage is higher (and statistically different) for drivers unaware of alternative 
garages in the area (79%), but is not much better in the case of those with knowledge of 
alternatives (69%). In fact, 78% of the latter reported not knowing the fees charged by 
these other garages.  
Similarly, the level of information on curbside fees was no better: 72% of 
respondents reported not knowing the hourly fee they would have to pay if parking in an 
on-street regulated space. This percentage fell to 64% – statistically lower – among 
those reporting have looked for a curbside space before entering the garage. Thus, 
drivers who search for on-street parking seem to be slightly better informed – or at least 
they believe themselves to be, as we shall argue below. It seems likely that this group 
look for curbside parking because they either know or think prices there are much 
cheaper than off-street parking, in addition, that is, to what is the usually greater 
preference for on-street parking.      
Although descriptive statistics are useful for demonstrating that drivers would 
appear to know very little about garage availability and parking fees, a multivariate 
analysis enables us to assess the factors that aggravate/mitigate problems of 
misinformation. Table 2 shows our main results for the multivariate analysis of the 
determinants of the customers’ level of information. The column illustrating Eq. (5) 
specifically refers to the model which explains customers’ knowledge of other garages 
(at least another one) in the vicinity of the one in which they parked, while Eq. (6) and 
Eq. (7) show our results for the models explaining customers’ level of information 
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about curbside and garage fees, respectively. As expected, because our survey 
specifically targeted garage users, the model for curbside fee knowledge performs worse 
than the other two. It is important, therefore, that we limit the results of this model to 
garage parkers and that we exercise caution when generalizing this result to all drivers. 
Yet, having said that, our descriptive statistics show that knowledge is not biased by the 
fact of our interviewing garage users, given that we find a surprisingly similar 
percentage of users claiming to know the curbside fee (28%) and those claiming to 
know the garage fee (26%).  
<<Insert Table 2. Logistic regression on misinformation>> 
In the multivariate models, the respondents’ age offers mixed results, while their 
gender does not seem to be statistically significant in any of the three models. Age is 
positively correlated and statistically significant with knowledge of other garages in the 
area, but it does not account for knowledge of curbside fees. When distinguishing by 
age groups – which offers a better fit than including age as a continuous variable – we 
find that young drivers (aged between 18 and 30) are almost four times more likely to 
claim to know garage prices than the other age groups (OR=3.82). 
Previous experience, based on the fact of having visited the garage on an earlier 
occasion (at least once), seems to be an important contributor to the users’ level of 
information about garages (both fees and availability), but irrelevant with respect to 
curbside information. Repeat users are 3.6 times more likely to know at least another 
garage in the area and 5.6 times more likely to know the fees charged by the garage in 
which they parked. This result is consistent with previous evidence on the importance of 
the accumulation of knowledge through experience. On the other hand, the likelihood of 
these drivers knowing curbside prices is no different from that of the rest of 
respondents.   
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To evaluate the purpose of the users’ trip, we use compulsory mobility for reasons 
of work or education as our reference category. The other trip purpose variables only 
offer significant effects in relation to misinformation about curbside fees. Model 2 
shows that respondents reporting the chief purpose of their trip to be shopping or leisure 
are less likely (OR=0.49) to know the curbside fee than those whose main purpose was 
compulsory mobility. In the rest of the models, differences in trip purpose do not seem 
to explain differences in misinformation.    
The price of the vehicle, included as a proxy for income, tells us that higher values 
seem to be statistically and positively correlated with knowledge of garage availability. 
Although it might be assumed that higher income parkers have lower incentives to 
acquire information due to the higher search costs, it also seems to be the case that they 
are likely to accumulate higher knowledge levels due to more parking purchases 
(exposure) and higher education levels (ability to process information), as discussed in 
the consumer behavior literature (Magi and Julander, 2005). In the models that 
categorize this variable by price interval, we find that with respect to drivers with the 
cheapest vehicles (up to 10,000 euros), those with vehicles valued between ten and 
twenty thousand euros, and those with vehicles valued higher than twenty thousand 
euros are about two times (OR=1.74 and 2.01, respectively) more likely to claim to have 
knowledge of at least another garage. This characteristic, however, does not seem to 
account for knowledge of fees, as evidenced by the estimates for Eq. (6) and Eq. (7). 
Nonetheless, having teletac seems to be a more important determinant of 
misinformation. Our results show that respondents with teletac are less likely to know 
about available garages in the area (OR=0.65) and even less likely to know the fees of 
the garage where they parked (OR=0.25). This finding is consistent with Soami (2001), 
who suggests that payment methods affect consumer spending behavior to the extent 
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that, in the case of routine purchases particularly, consumers tend to be less forward 
looking and to rely heavily on past experience. Teletac reduces consumer price 
awareness and, hence, their ability to evaluate past payments retrospectively. At the 
same time it acts as a constraint on the parking alternatives of those using this payment 
system, since it is typically given by employers to employees for work-related trips and 
serves, in part, as payment in kind (company car). To the best of our knowledge, this is 
the first empirical confirmation of such a relation in the transport sector. 
The length of parking stay appears statistically significant at the 10% level and 
positively correlates with the knowledge of garage fees (OR= 1.01), while it does not 
seem relevant for knowledge of curbside fees. 
Active information acquisition strategies, such as undertaking search activities, also 
offer interesting results. First, we find that drivers who reported having searched for 
other garages in the area are three times more likely to claim they know of the existence 
of other garages (OR=3.10). As such, active search seems to provide better knowledge 
about supply, but no statistically significant difference is found in relation to knowledge 
about garage fees. In contrast, respondents that searched for on-street parking are twice 
as likely to report knowing the curbside fee. Active pre-trip search only correlates with 
a considerable degree of misinformation about curbside fees, but it does not seem to 
have a statistically significant impact on garage fees, even though the odds ratio 
recorded is 1.5. This might be explained by the fact that such parkers are specifically 
interested in parking in their final destination and rule out the option of curbside 
parking, while the low degree of precision in the estimates might be explained by the 
small number of respondents who actually conducted a search before starting out on 
their trip (about 3%).  
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The characteristics of the garage also seem to influence the level of user 
information. When the garage is linked to a specific facility (a shopping mall, public 
building, theater or hospital), the respondents’ level of information is significantly lower 
(OR=0.44) but they are nearly twice as likely to know the fee (OR= 1.81). These 
respondents do not differ with respect to other respondents in the case of information 
about curbside fees. This suggests that drivers parking in garages linked to specific 
facilities tend to have a limited knowledge of the market outside that particular facility 
(i.e. their final destination constrains their information acquisition needs), but better 
knowledge about the specific garage of the facility.  
Respondents parking in garages that are franchises of garage networks are twice as 
likely (OR=2.24) to claim to know the garage fee than the rest of the respondents. 
Knowledge of the brand can facilitate the recognition of shared attributes and make the 
knowledge gathered in the franchise’s facilities highly transferable, including the fee. 
The variables related to obfuscation activities also provide important insights into 
the problem of misinformation. We find that fee complexity slightly aggravates 
misinformation on garage fees (OR= 0.98), while fee saliency increases parkers’ 
subjective knowledge of prices (OR= 1.26). Finally, the fact of being entitled to some 
kind of discount means respondents are much more likely to claim they know the 
garage fee – note we estimate a massive odds ratio of 18.77. This increase in subjective 
knowledge presumably reflects greater exposure to price information and the higher 
cognitive requirements needed to process it. In short, the implication is that such users 
are much more likely to have consciously transformed this information into actual 
knowledge. 
The economic activity of the area is significant – and positively related – to the 
knowledge of the curbside fee reported by the respondents (OR=1.17), which might be 
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explained by the enhanced possibilities of completing various errands within the same 
parking episode. The number of garages that can be observed from the entrance to the 
garage where the respondent parked is statistically significant at the 10% level but 
negatively related to knowledge of the garage fee (OR= 0.76). This could be attributable 
to the fact that search costs depend on the number of available firms one might purchase 
from; thus, in atomistic markets it is increasingly difficult for customers to gain such 
information (Stiglitz, 1989). The less informed consumers are, the more the market 
equilibrium will tend towards monopoly prices. This highlights an important relation 
between misinformation and market competition. 
4.2 Misperception 
Declaring that one knows or does not know the price to leave one’s vehicle in a garage 
is no guarantee that this information is accurate. According to our survey, the average 
garage fee recalled for the first hour of parking was 2.91 €/h (Std. Dev. 0.96 €/h) 
compared to a true sample mean of 3.18 €/h (Std. Dev. 0.33 €/h). We found no  
statistical difference between those that reported knowing (2.84€/h) and those that 
reported not knowing the fee (2.95€/h). Both groups recalled lower fees than those 
actually charged.   
We can simply measure fee misperception as the difference between the price 
recalled and the actual fee charged at the garage, which gives an average of -0.27 €/h 
(Std. Dev. 1.04€/h). This misperception is the same for those who undertook an active 
search for a garage, while the opposite was the case for those who had previously 
looked for a curbside spot. As Albalate and Gragera (2018) argue, the fact that the latter 
tried to park on the curbside initially is probably an indication that on-street parking was 
their preferred option and that these users are less likely to park in a garage (having less 
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prior experience). This is, in fact, confirmed by comparing means between both groups 
with a t-test. 
When computing the average deviation of recalled fees from the real fee without 
taking into account whether they were higher or lower – in absolute values – we find 
that respondents deviate by an average of 0.78 €/h (Std. Dev. 0.70€/h) from the real 
price of the garage. Respect to the real curbside fee, this represents an average deviation 
of 25%.  
Misperception also seems to exist in the case of curbside fees. The average price 
recall of respondents (all of whom claimed to know the fee) was 1.78 €/h (Std. Dev. 
1.23€/h), which is much lower than the real average fee of 2.63 €/h (Std. Dev. 0.14€/h). 
Interestingly, the difference seems to be led by the group of drivers that actually 
searched for on-street spaces. These drivers recall much lower fees (0.96€/hour) than 
those who went directly to park in a garage (2.46 €/hour). This might mean that part of 
the cruising for parking can be explained by driver misperceptions, that is, the belief 
that on-street parking is much cheaper than it actually is. Additionally, it suggests that 
this misperception might partially explain the previously estimated curbside premium 
for garage demand (Gragera and Albalate, 2016), translating into a higher pricing 
distortion in the market that further exacerbates cruising. However, the average 
difference between recalled and real curbside prices is lower than that found for 
garages, namely -0.12 €/h (Std. Dev. 0.64€/h). If we take the average deviation in 
absolute terms, we find that respondents deviate from the real curbside fee by an 
average of 0.47 €/h (Std. Dev. 0.45 €/h). Respect to the real price, this represents an 
average deviation of 18%. Indeed, the correlation matrix between real and guessed fees 
indicates an important decoupling (See Table 3). 
<<Insert Table 3. Correlation matrix between guessed and real fees>> 
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The descriptive statistics point to an important problem of misperception. Table 4 
shows our main results for the multivariate analysis of the determinants of 
misperception, which enables us to identify the characteristics that aggravate/mitigate 
this problem. Estimates for Eq. (8) and Eq. (9) refer to the models assessing 
determinants of garage and curbside fee misperception, respectively. 
<<Table 4. Least squares estimates on parking fee misperception>> 
Age and gender variables do not seem to explain much of the parking fee 
misperception. Only in the case of respondents older than 64 do we find a positive 
correlation with misperception about curbside fees at the 5% significance level, possibly 
reflecting a decreasing ability to process price information with age. But no differences 
are found for garage fees.  
Other individual features, specifically the frequency of monthly parking 
episodes in the area and using an electronic payment method (teletac), do seem to affect 
misperception. In the first case, repeated parking episodes in the area seem to help the 
driver have better information about both curbside and garage fees, suggesting that 
higher exposure to price information reduces misperception. In the second case, the use 
of teletac seems to worsen users’ information accuracy in the case of garage fees, since 
the payment method offers fewer incentives and consciously reduces their price 
information processing. These results are consistent with our previous findings related 
to experience and the use of electronic payment devices in determining the level of 
knowledge of parking fees.   
Search activities do not seem to improve information accuracy. Yet, garage 
characteristics do appear to be particularly relevant. We find evidence that obfuscation 
may promote misperception. On the one hand, price saliency is negatively correlated 
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with misperception, indicating that it is a good instrument for promoting more accurate 
price recall by drivers, that is by providing greater exposure to price information. On the 
other hand, complexity hampers drivers’ ability to process price information and 
appears to be positively correlated with parkers’ misperception. Thus, fee simplification 
and promoting price visibility seem to constitute two clear options for limiting 
misperception. Interestingly, respondents also seem to have more accurate information 
about the fees charged when they park in garages belonging to franchises or networks, 
probably due to pricing strategy similarities that increase the users’ ability to recall 
prices more accurately, especially if they have parked on other occasions in garages 
belonging to that network. 
Curbside fee misperception is also worse among users whose trip is undertaken for a 
purpose other than that of compulsory mobility (work and education), which seems to 
be the purpose that ensures parkers have a better knowledge of curbside fees due to 
higher information exposure (passive). However, this result is not maintained in the 
case of garage fees, which might require a more active information acquisition process 
compared to that associated with on-street parking.  
Finally, the amount of economic/commercial activity in the immediate area is 
associated with poorer accuracy in the case of garage fees, but with greater accuracy in 
the case of curbside fees. Likewise, district fixed effects seem to matter for the level of 
information accuracy, as they capture unobservable area characteristics influencing 
consumers’ ability to accurately recall prices through information exposure levels 
associated with the urban pattern, parking options and the distribution of economic 
activity. 
This confirmation of the misperception of both curbside and garage fees is a matter 
of concern. However, the misperception regarding the relative price of garage parking 
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and on-street parking is a matter that goes beyond a simple information problem, given 
that it would appear to be an essential determinant of cruising for parking, which  leads 
to aggravated inefficiencies. Indeed, this misperception of relative pricing can be 
constructed as a difference between recalled and real fees. On average, respondents 
estimate a difference between garage and curbside fees of 1.04 €/h, while in reality the 
average difference between the two is 0.56 €/h (the garage fee being higher than that 
charged at the curb). Surprisingly, 82% of respondents believe the difference to be 
greater than it actually is. Differences per individual are even more substantial when we 
focus our attention on those searching for on-street parking (1.94 €/h) and contrast this 
with those not looking for curbside spots (0.44 €/h). These results are of particular 
relevance for parkers that prefer on-street parking and who are aggravating the existing 
pricing distortion in the market. The estimated misperception of drivers who head 
straight to a garage facility is almost equivalent to the curbside premium (0.55€/h) 
reported by Gragera and Albalate (2016), which suggests that the previously assumed 
curbside preference might not derive from walking costs and its more ubiquitous 
distribution (Kobus et al., 2013) but from a price misperception. 
Moreover, individuals searching for curbside spots seem to be more prone to believe 
that the curb is comparatively cheaper than it really is. If we assume that the 
misperception of curbside parkers is the same as that estimated for those that searched 
for curbside spots in our sample, this means that the pricing efficiency gap computed in 
this market does not lie between 0.45€–1.05€/h as it did for garage parkers (Gragera and 
Albalate, 2016), but between 1.84€–2.44€/h for curbside parkers with the true value 
lying somewhere in between. This is of considerable relevance as it implies the need for 
much greater increases in fees if cruising is to be eliminated without first addressing 
information issues. It indicates that misperception does not only affect consumer 
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decisions, but that it further aggravates cruising-for-parking and associated externalities, 
and makes any policy intervention through prices much more difficult from a political 
economy perspective. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
In this study, we have examined garage parkers’ misinformation and misperception 
as measures of consumers’ subjective and objective knowledge regarding available 
parking options and prices, respectively. This is the first paper to assess the contribution 
of several potential determinants of these two dimensions of information in the parking 
market. 
Our findings suggest that parkers have low levels of knowledge about available 
parking alternatives and their prices. Moreover, the level of accuracy of this information 
is poor and biased towards prioritizing curbside parking. This results in demand 
misallocation that further exacerbates cruising-for-parking and limits effective price 
competition in the market. Misinformation and misperception hinder the beneficial 
effects of any parking policy interventions if they are not appropriately addressed. 
The level of exposure to market information seems to be a crucial determinant of 
parkers’ knowledge. Among our findings, we highlight that previous experience helps 
users increase both their subjective and objective knowledge dimensions, that income 
positively correlates with knowledge of garage options, and that users engaged on 
compulsory mobility-related trips show comparatively better knowledge of curbside 
prices. The conducting of search activity does not seem to be especially effective in 
increasing knowledge other than reducing misinformation regarding the availability of 
garage options and misperception of curbside fees. 
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The specific characteristics of the selected garage and its surrounding area also play 
a role in determining the users’ levels of information. Drivers using garages associated 
with a particular commercial activity are less well informed about available competing 
alternatives, which acts as a restriction on their choice set, but have more accurate 
information about prices as do those who opt to park at a franchise facility, a 
characteristic associated with greater exposure levels and knowledge transferability. The 
level of economic activity in the immediate area increases users’ knowledge about the 
prices of both garages and on-street parking, which seems to be associated with the 
increased probability of users running a series of errands. Finally, price saliency 
increases knowledge accuracy and fee complexity reduces it, suggesting that garages’ 
obfuscation strategies are indeed keeping parkers uninformed. 
As information is a public good it requires public intervention if it is to be provided 
in optimal quantity and quality. In this respect, we advocate a greater role for the public 
sector in the establishment of provision standards, incentivizing up-to-date, private-
sector information disclosure and active cooperation, while curbing data gathering costs 
and data maintenance in a neutral platform. From the perspective of promoting 
competition, it would also be advisable to make parking price saliency mandatory in 
order to prevent the negative market effects induced by garages’ obfuscation strategies. 
Indeed, our evidence suggests that the greater the exposure to this information, the 
better informed consumers are likely to be. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of covariates employed in the empirical models.  
 
Variable Mean Std.Err. Min Max 
Age 47.36 12.87 20 91 
Age18 0.08 0.26 0 1 
Age65+ 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Gender 0.64 0.48 0 1 
Frequent 0.77 0.41 0 1 
Frequency 2.71 5.53 0 30 
Vehicle_Price 18.81 12.53 7.49 107.88 
VP10K-20K 0.39 0.49 0 1 
VP20K+ 0.43 0.49 0 1 
Discount 0.016 0.13 0 1 
Teletac 0.41 0.49 0 1 
Time 169.31 97.36 5 600 
Search_Garage 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Search_Curb 0.17 0.38 0 1 
Search_Info 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Leisure 0.37 0.48 0 1 
Personal 0.27 0.44 0 1 
Admin 0.16 0.36 0 1 
Facility 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Franchise 0.72 0.44 0 1 
Saliency 0.31 0.46 0 1 
Complexity 38.65 27.99 12 172 
Eco_activity 6.23 2.68 1.34 10.81 






























Sociodemographic    
Age 1.016 (0.008)** - - 
Age 18-30 - 1.557(0.756) 3.819 (1.469)*** 
Age 65+ - 1.798 (0.714) 0.894 (0.344) 
Gender 1.067 (0.228) 1.246 (0.378) 0.975 (0.256) 
Frequent 3.625 (1.075)*** 1.621 (0.617) 5.589 (2.654)*** 
Vehicle Price 1.018 (0.010)** - 0.987 (0.009) 
VP10K-20K - 1.599 (0.674) - 
VP20K+ - 1.054 (0.452) - 
Discount 0.858 (0.566) - 18.774 (15.84)*** 
Teletac 0.654 (0.165)* 0.812 (0.304) 0.245 (0.114) *** 
Time - 1.000 (0.000) 1.001 (0.000)* 
Search activities    
Search_Garage 3.08 (1.359)** - 1.892 (0.977) 
Search_Curb  1.999 (0.729)* - 
Search_Info 1.335 (0.703) 0.138 (0.127)** 1.456 (0.974) 
Trip purpose    
Leisure 1.168 (0.304) 0.487 (0.178)** 0.705 (0.238) 
Personal 0.787 (0.299) 0.859 (0.402) 1.563 (0.676) 
Administrative 0.836 (0.271) 0.831 (0.340) 0.530 (0.210) 
Garage features    
Facility 0.439 (0.121)*** 1.552 (0.656) 1.809 (0.621)* 
Franchise - - 2.238 (0.849)** 
Complexity - - 0.987 (0.006)** 
Saliency - - 1.266 (0.466) 
Area features    
N_Garages - 0.958 (0.191) 0.757 (0.129)* 
Economic_activity 1.066 (0.044) 1.178 (0.072)*** 0.970 (0.057) 
N. Observations 436 274 433 
Log pseudolikelihood -274.94 -165.46 -206.97 
Wald chi2 41.9*** 25.01** 68.28*** 
Pseudo R2 0.09 0.08 0.17 





Table 3. Correlation matrix of guessed and real fees.  
 
 Guessed GF Guessed CF Real GF Real CF 
Guessed GF 1 -0.1700 0.0235 0.0641 
Guessed CF -0.1700 1 0.0469 -0.1691 
Real GF 0.0235 0.0469 1 -0.0735 




















Sociodemographic   
Age 0.003 (0.005) - 
Age 18-30 - -0.165 (0.419) 
Age 65+ - 0.412 (0.229)** 
Gender 0.087 (0.147) - 
Frequency -0.039 (0.013)*** -0.636 (0.308)** 
Vehicle Price 0.0005 (0.004) -0.004 (0.006) 
Teletac 1.035 (0.241)*** 0.176 (0.279) 
Time -0.0002 (0.0003) -0.0001(0.0004) 
Search activities   
Search_Garage 0.164 (0.246) - 
Search_Curb - 0.056 (0.348) 
Search_Info 0.285 (0.353) - 
Trip purpose   
Leisure -0.157 (0.176) 0.770 (0.231)*** 
Personal -0.330 (0.223) 0.667 (0.375)* 
Administrative -0.064 (0.188) 0.593 (0.287)** 
Garage features   
Facility 0.169 (0.228) - 
Franchise -0.825 (0.248)*** - 
Complexity 0.007 (0.003)** - 
Saliency -0.403 (0.201)** - 
Area features   
N_Garages 0.146 (0.094) - 
Economic_activity -0.080 (0.041)** 0.134 (0.074)* 
District Fixed effects   
2 0.967 (0.268)*** -0.661 (0.437) 
3 0.297 (0.454) -1.043 (0.379)*** 
4 -0.221 (0.402) -0.557 (0.530) 
5 0.384 (0.237)* -0.770 (0.429)* 
6 0.002 (0.349) -0.389 (0.373) 
7 -1.867 (0.392)*** - 
10 1.760 (0.267)*** -2.146 (0.545)*** 
N. Observations 303 89 
F-Test 2.11*** 2.25*** 
R2 0.15 0.37 














Figure 1. Location of garage facilities and the total raw number of surveys conducted at each of 
them. 
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